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The role of Supreme Audit Institutions in fight against the 
consequences of financial and economic crisis 
A theoretical approach 
  Sándor Nagy 
There is a significant pressure on Supreme Audit Institutions in Europe: shrinking available 
resources and growing expectations from its stakeholders (citizens, civil organizations, 
investors, governments etc.). In consequence of the financial and economic crisis and the 
unpredictable shocks, imbalances there is a relevant need for good governance and effective 
spending of public money. The Supreme Audit Institution (SAI) – as independent external 
auditor of the budget – is intended to reach appropriate level of audit impact by using its inputs. 
This impact may result lower governmental expenditures, effectiver public finance management, 
increasing trust, transparency and accountability. Responding to the constantly changing 
circumstances the SAI should use and activate non-conventional resources such as knowledge 
and social capital to be more adaptive, effective and to achieve its strategic goals. 
Keywords: financial and economic crisis, cooperation, Supreme Audit Institutions, ECA, INTOSAI 
1. Introduction 
The global financial and economic crisis and its intensifying aftershocks are still hitting the EU’s 
economy clouding the long-term outlooks. It has been the most pervasive and deepest turmoil after the 
Second World War and the process of recovery seems to be long-lasting, risky and fragile. The wide-
spread downturn (solvency and later systemic crisis) - which can be dated from the Lehman-Broder’s 
bankruptcy (September, 2008) caused basically by the huge delinquency rates and subprime 
writedowns induced by the burst of the U.S. housing bubble - penetrated into the global financial 
channels reaching firstly the U.K. then the rest of the European Union. The money, the capital and the 
interbank markets had been paralyzed because bankers ignored to lend credit even to each other. In 
consequence of the triggering circumstances the Member States had to face squeezing credit 
conditions, sharp output contraction, decreasing business investments and capacity utilization, ailing 
exchange markets, share prices, rising unemployment, lacking resources on innovation and R&D 
activities, falling house prices, melting household wealth, slumping consumer and investor confidence 
and trust or even the nightmare of an accelerating economic downward spiral, which the social burden 
of ageing could further stimulate. So the governments, the European Union’s decision makers, the 
European Central Bank in cooperation with the national issue banks had to take significant, efficient, 
timely and prompt policy responses to react on the worsening problems. Central banks launched 
stimulus monetary actions and shortly after that - in accordance with the monetary packages - 
governments intervened to support banks affected by the stress and to boost the real economy. The 
wide range of stimulus packages were primarily based on the pillars and principle of the European 
Economy Recovery Plan (EERP) reaching a total sum of ca. 2% of EU-27 GDP – of which two-thirds 
were implemented in 2009 and the remainder in 2010 (EC, 2008; EC, 2009a, p. 14; Jackson, 2009). 
These public spending and new governmental commitments fell in the audit scope of the national 
Supreme Audit Institutions (SAIs) which are responsible for the external, independent auditing of the 
state budget and the executive actions. The changing financial-economic background has been posing 
new challenges for the SAIs too. In the next sections I demonstrate the functions of the external 
auditor institutions related to the crisis (INTOSAI, 2009a). 
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2. General Auditing Functions and Features (GAFF) of a SAI and the 
expedient, necessary auditing activities during the crisis 
The supreme audit institutions (SAIs) have the mandate on national level to conduct external audits to 
serve the taxpayers’ and citizens’ claim for rational, efficient, effective, legal spending of public 
money. These organizations predominantly characterized by independence, professionalism, probity 
but often with different mandates and access rights. Through audit activities and extension of SAI’s 
functions the financial accountability, the good governance, the proper management of public funds 
could be enforced and in the same time the confidence towards budgetary organizations can be 
maintained or restored. For successful operation, and to generate added value of its reports there are 
several factors must be considered: adequate funding, facilities, compatible staff and other 
professional capacities, the adoption of international standards (e.g. ISSAI standards), supportive 
environment, cooperation, knowledge sharing with other SAIs and specialized organizations (World 
Bank, 2001; INTOSAI, 2009b). In case of effective function the government expenditures, the general 
level of corruption can decrease, while the perceived government effectiveness, the competitive 
pressure on executive bodies and the general productivity of resources could grow (Blume and Voigt, 
2010; Kovács, 2010). The SAIs generally have the following types of audits to apply (auditing 
mandate): 
- regularity audit, financial statements audit or financial audit (ISSAI 100 – 39): the SAI 
assesses the legality and accuracy of the financial statements, operations of government bodies 
and the related financial accountings. 
- performance audit or value-for-money audit (ISSAI 100 – 41): it covers the evaluation of 
usage of public money considering the economy, efficiency and effectiveness criteria; the 
auditor examines whether the taxpayers have received value for public money. 
- comprehensive audit (ISSAI 100 – 43.): it exceeds the limitations of the regulatory audits by 
focusing on the internal management and regulatory system including the control mechanism 
(ÁSZ 2008, p. 174; INTOSAI, 2001). 
Accepting the taxonomy of the National Audit Office of Finland (Valtiontalouden tarkastusvirasto) the 
management of the crisis can be divided into five different stages. In the next sections I draw up the 
characteristics of responses and possible tasks of the auditor referring to the Subgroup 2a1 report 
(National Audit Office of Finland, 2011). The categorization of this document is very similar to the 
European Commission’s study2 (EC, 2009a) but this one is focusing rather on (auditing) professional 
aspects. The basic presupposition of the Subgroup’s work is that the existence and well-functioning of 
a certain regulatory system is essential to avoid future crises or at least reduce the probability of the 
emergence. The financial regulatory system consists of Central Banks, Government institutions and 
other special regulatory institutions whose activities could shape and adjust the rules. 
I. Preparedness: this is the status or condition of the regulatory system before the turmoil starts. The 
main desirable nature of the regulation is the preparation, the maintenance of appropriate level of risk 
observation, risk assessment and management of the hazard. Here must set out the pillars, foundations 
of the government actions for the following phases. 
                                                     
1
 Member SAIs of the INTOSAI Task Force Global Financial Crisis Subgroup 2a: Finland (chair) – 
Valtiontalouden tarkastusvirasto, Austria – Rechnungshof, Estonia – Riigikontroll, Netherlands – Algemene 
Rekenkamer, United Kingdom – National Audit Office, United States of America – Government Accountability 
Office and Denmark (observer) – Rigsrevisionen 
2
 Stages in the EC’s study: crisis prevention, crisis control and mitigation, crisis resolution 
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The crisis-related auditing functions and features (CRAFF) of an individual SAI related to the 
preparedness (National Audit Office of Finland, 2011): 
- The mandate of the SAI is determinant in the impact of its work. Only 70% of the EU Member 
State SAIs have mandate to audit the governments’ rescue packages (Caldeira, 2009) 
- The main objective for a certain SAI is to help creating and operating a flexible and resilient 
regulatory system. 
- SAI should have a continously improved watch dog function on public spending ensuring the 
fulfillment of the legality, the compliance and the good governance aspects 
- The SAI could have a role in auditing (predominantly with comprehensive audits) and giving 
recommendations to the existence, operation and the adequacy of the control and risk 
management systems are in place. 
- conducting mainly performance audits on the regulatory system 
- assuring the quality and reliability of the most relevant financial information 
- learning, collecting information, extending knowledge base about the financial markets, actors 
and the regulatory system 
- the SAI should follow and oversee the development of the whole system 
- cooperation with other SAIs and institutions to have a proper level of general knowledge 
which should be extended in case of crises 
II. Immediate response: this phase covers the Central Bank’s monetary and the government’s 
financial and fiscal actions to limit the extent of the crisis and prevent the financial system from 
collapsing. For effective interventions it is essential the broad and deep understanding of the unfolding 
situation, the characteristics and the extent of the remedial actions should be done. This requires an 
already existing framework for the possible actions which encompassing overall objectives, relevant 
actors, availability of accurate, reliable information, clear roles and responsibilities and well-designed 
coordination and reporting mechanisms. In order to get a more accurate picture about the interventions 
the next table summarizes the main elements of the actions. 
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Table 1: The main actions put into effect by Central Banks and Governments in the EU 
Institutions and the type of actions Interventions 
Central Banks and the European Central Bank 
(ECB) 
- cutting back the interest rates 
- injections of liquidity in cooperation with the 
European System of Central Banks (ESCB) 
- introduction of asset swap schemes 
- outright purchases of securities 
- lengthening the maturity of loans granted 
- widening the range of eligible collateral 
- broadening the group of counterparties 
- giving financial institutions access to virtually 
unlimited lender-of-last-resort facilities 
Government actions - giving guarantees to bank depositors and 
creditors 
- recapitalization of financial sector 
- asset purchases 
- insurance schemes to protect banks from toxic 
assets 
- providing credit possibilities to non-financial 
institutions 
- structuring bail-out programs 
Governmental fiscal stimulus measures - investment subsidy 
- government investments 
- government consumption 
- reduction in consumption tax 
- government transfers 
- cutting back labour tax and corporate profit tax 
Real-economy boosting by the governments – 
Labour market 
- encouraging flexible working time 
- cutting labour costs to support employment 
- retraining and activation 
- supporting households’ purchasing power 
- maintaining, reinforcing social protection 
- mitigation the impact of financial crisis on 
individuals 
Real-economy boosting by the governments – 
Investments 
- increasing energy efficiency 
- building physical infrastructure 
- supporting Research and Development 
activities 
- promoting innovation 
Real-economy boosting by the governments – 
Business support 
- sectoral supports 
- easing access to finance 
Source: own edited on the basis of EC (2009a, 2009b), IMF (2009) and the National Audit Office of 
Finland (2011) 
If interventions are realized they have direct or indirect impacts on state budget and finally on 
taxpayers’ interest and expectations. Excessive supports often imply increasing financial burdens on 
citizens. It is commonly accepted, that expenditure of public money on stimulus measures is only 
justified or eligible when systemic risks emerge. The systemic risk arises from the interconnections, 
links and interdependencies among the members/elements of the whole financial system, so the 
contagion (e.g. solvency problems, toxic assets, distrust etc.) could spread over the network of the 
financial markets threatening the stable function of several institutions and could have undesired 
effects on the real economy (Dijkman, 2010; National Audit Office of Finland, 2011). Without sound 
and considerable knowledge which is able to scan the processes on network-theory bases, it would be 
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very difficult to assess the significance of the systemic risk or any kind of jeopardy. The above listed 
interventions posed a huge burden on the public sector. To perceive the extent of the spending the next 
tables illustrate the weights of the actions. 
Table 2: Public interventions in favour of the banking sector in some EU Member State (% of 
GDP) - Extract from the original source. 
EU Member 
State 
Capital 
injections 
(effective) 
Guarantees on 
bank 
liabilities 
(granted) 
Relief of 
impaired 
assets 
(effective) 
Liquidity and 
bank funding 
support 
(effective) 
Total 
Austria 1,7 5,1 0,4 1,5 8,7 
Belgium 5,7 16,3 5,0 NR 35,3 
France 0,8 3,1 0,3 - 4,2 
Germany 1,6 7,3 0,4 NR 6,3 
Greece - 0,4 - 1,7 2,1 
Hungary 0,1 - - - 0,1 
Netherlands 7,9 5,7 4,9 5,8 24,3 
Sweden 0,2 8,8 - - 9,0 
United Kingdom 2,6 9,5 - 18,7 30,8 
Euro area  1,4 8,3 0,7 0,7 11,1 
European Union 0,5 7,8 0,5 3,0 11,8 
NR: Not Reported 
Source: EC (2009a, p. 63) 
The second table enumerates only effective costs of the public interventions to the banking sector but 
the approved ceiling of the expendable sources (upper limit of the intervention) were higher. The next 
table indicates figures about the burdens of some discretionary stimulus actions in the same countries 
listed above. 
Table 3: Policy responses to the economic crisis in some EU Member States (% of GDP) – 
Extract from the original source. 
 Discretionary stimulus (aggregate over 2009-10 - % of GDP) 
EU Member 
State 
Measures 
aimed at 
households 
Increased 
spending on 
labour market 
Measures 
aimed at 
businesses 
Increased 
investment 
expenditure 
Overall 
Austria 2,6 0,2 0,2 0,5 3,5 
Belgium 0,9 0,5 0,1 0,3 1,8 
France 0,2 0,1 0,4 0,3 1,0 
Germany 1,5 0,5 0,8 0,9 3,6 
Greece 0,3 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,3 
Hungary 0,0 0,0 0,0 NA 0,0 
Netherlands 0,4 0,2 0,5 0,5 1,6 
Sweden 0,4 1,8 0,4 0,6 3,2 
United Kingdom 1,7 0,3 0,4 0,2 2,6 
NA: Not Available 
Source: EC (2009b, p. 16) 
The crisis-related auditing functions and features (CRAFF) of an individual SAI related to the 
immediate response (INTOSAI, 2010a, b; National Audit Office of Finland, 2011): 
- the main objective is to monitor and conduct audits on responses to the financial turmoil 
- it should build immediately deployable capacities (human and technical) 
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- cooperation with national SAIs and other oversight institutions (INTOSAI, EUROSAI, IFAC 
– International Federation of Accountants, IMF etc.) 
- setting up multidisciplinary teams in accordance with the audit challenges the SAI must face 
- recurring performance audits on the financial regulatory system 
- SAI should optimalize its financial resources focusing on the immediate policy responses 
- government should increase the budget of the SAI reflecting on the crisis-related auditing 
functions but it has to maintain the independence 
- SAI should activate conventional and non-conventional resources to meet the additional 
expectations of citizens 
- supporting decision makers 
- SAI should harmonize the overlapping audit tasks with internal auditors 
- delivering directed, relavant and timely information, audit reports and opinions 
(transformational function) 
- usage of modern media channels to distribute information (e.g. official website dealing with 
the immediate responses)  
- to ensure the integrity, transparency and the „same quality” of data stemmed from several 
sources 
- to avoid confusion and unprovoked, superfluous fears 
III. Management of the crisis: This phase can be described by insolvencies, bankruptcies, melting 
capital stocks and the sustained economic depression. To demonstrate the freezing of the economy the 
following table draws up some characteristics of the negative trends. 
Table 4: Economic indicators reflecting the impact of the financial crisis in EU-27 
EU 
Member 
State 
GDP 
growth 
2009 
Fall in 
industry 
production 
index 
(2009.II./2008. 
II.) 
Change in 
unemployment 
rate (from 2008 
to 2010) 
Private 
consumption 
growth 
(2009-2008) 
Budget 
balance 
2010-
Budget 
balance 
2008 
Government 
debt ratio 
2010 
Austria -4,00 -14,60 3,30 -0,80 -4,90 75,20 
Belgium -3,50 -19,00 3,30 -1,70 -4,90 100,90 
Bulgaria -1,60 -17,40 2,20 -5,10 -1,80 17,30 
Cyprus 0,30 -5,10 2,20 -6,00 -3,50 47,90 
Czech 
Republic 
-2,70 -20,30 3,00 -2,70 -3,40 37,9 
Denmark -3,30 -11,83 3,30 -1,50 -7,50 33,70 
Estonia -10,30 -30,22 8,60 -5,20 -0,90 7,80 
Finland -4,70 -19,91 2,90 -3,40 -7,10 45,70 
France -3,00 -19,26 2,90 -1,20 -3,60 86,00 
Germany -5,40 -20,58 3,10 -0,40 -5,80 78,70 
Greece -0,90 -4,9 2,00 -1,80 -0,70 108,00 
Hungary -6,30 -25,45 3,40 -5,90 -0,50 82,30 
Ireland -9,00 NA 9,70 -7,10 -8,50 79,70 
Italy -4,40 -20,71 2,60 -0,80 -2,10 116,10 
Latvia -13,10 -24,16 8,50 -11,00 -9,60 50,10 
Lithuania -11,00 -12,36 10,10 -22,20 -4,80 31,90 
Luxembourg -3,00 NA 2,10 -0,60 -5,40 16,40 
Malta -0,90 NA 1,70 -3,30 1,50 68,90 
Netherlands -3,50 -5,9 3,40 -1,80 -7,10 63,10 
Poland -1,40 -12,36 5,00 -4,70 -3,40 59,70 
Crisis Aftermath: Economic policy changes in the EU and its Member States  
 
276 
EU 
Member 
State 
GDP 
growth 
2009 
Fall in 
industry 
production 
index 
(2009.II./2008. 
II.) 
Change in 
unemployment 
rate (from 2008 
to 2010) 
Private 
consumption 
growth 
(2009-2008) 
Budget 
balance 
2010-
Budget 
balance 
2008 
Government 
debt ratio 
2010 
Portugal -3,70 -15,59 2,10 -2,90 -4,10 81,50 
Romania -4,00 -13,9 1,90 -12,80 -0,2 22,70 
Slovak 
Republic 
-2,60 -27,4 2,60 -5,60 -3,20 36,30 
Slovenia -3,40 -21,20 3,00 -2,60 -5,60 34,90 
Spain -3,20 -22,00 9,20 -3,20 -6,00 62,30 
Sweden -4,00 -20,28 4,20 -2,80 -6,40 47,20 
United 
Kingdom 
-3,80 -13,90 3,80 -4,80 -8,30 81,70 
NA=Not Available 
Source: EC (2009b, p. 13) 
In this section the clearly defined goals and responsibilities for different actors strengthen the 
accountability. For any kind of regulatory institution it is indispensable to be flexible and adaptive 
because of the specificity of the current downturn and the unpredictability of future crises. The 
governmental and monetary steps taken in the previous phase - to fight against systemic crisis - and 
their aftershocks here start to exert the harmful effects supplemented by the retracting forces of the 
extreme slowdown. These adverse effects are – for example – the distorted market conditions, growing 
public liabilities and financial commitments, worsening financial positions, higher inflation rate. The 
most important tasks the executive bodies have to face (National Audit Office of Finland, 2011): 
- management of special risks related to the new financial commitments 
- understanding and protection of the taxpayers’ interests 
- keeping in mind the criteria of “good governance”: consensus oriented activities, participation, 
cooperation, effective and efficient use of public money, responsive operation, accountability, 
transparency, equitable and inclusive regulations, following the rules of law (Kovács, 2010, 
p. 43) 
- preparation on the next stage (exit strategies) when the government remove and extract the 
invested resources 
In order to react on the described situation the crisis-related auditing functions and features (CRAFF) 
of a SAI are the following (National Audit Office of Finland, 2011): 
- supporting the flexibility and adaptibility of government institutions 
- clear objective settings for the SAI as well 
- auditing of the valuation and reporting of assets and liabilities held by the public 
- conducting performance audits on how the government institutions manage the new financial 
commitments 
- reporting to taxpayers about the negative and positive effects of the stimulus packages 
- maintaning trust, confidence and thereby strengthening social capital 
The causes and the harmful consequences of the crisis generate a “vacuum zone” in the economy, 
which can be characterized by the shortage on important factors (e.g. confidence, resources, capacities, 
clear information, proper risk management or well-functioning of the regulatory system) which are 
essential for recovering and to achieve the “expansive zone” where the GDP could grow again. The 
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main anomalies – hindering the prosperity – crystallizing around three pillars: falling economic 
performance, increasing public debt, instability and unsustainability. Among these pillars there are 
strong interdependencies, cohesion creating subversive, devastating synergies. According to the 
referenced studies and reports several triggering circumstances can be distinguished leading to the 
development of the main problems (Dijkman, 2010; EC, 2009a,b; Eurostat, 2011a,b; Larsson, 2011; 
National Audit Office of Finland, 2011; Riksrevisionen, 2010). 
1. Sharp reduction in the EU’s GDP: lower purchasing power of the resident actors; export 
markets' slowdown; loss of relative positions of competitiveness; innovation may be 
hampered, impeded because it is easy to cut back in case of recessions; decreasing stock of 
equipment and infrastructure and become obsolete due to lower investment; reducing 
confidence of investors; dropping FDI inflows; unemployment and its side effects. 
2. Public debt growth induced by: fiscal stimulus costs too much; increasing social costs (ageing 
problem); falling of tax revenues; expensive costs of the external indebtedness due to 
unfavourable exchange rate trends; worsening credit ratings (Moody’s, S&P, Fitch Ratings); 
inefficient use of public resources. 
3. Financial instability and the lack of sustainability: contagion effects; increasing global 
imbalances, capital concentrations; liquidity, solvency and systemic risks; lack of proper risk 
assessment; risks of financial management; malfunction of the regulatory system; not efficient 
allocation of financial resources; high and unstable inflation; imbalances in real economy, 
overvalued assets; lack of trust, confidence; increasing fiscal deficit, public debt and implicit 
liabilities (e.g. pension system). 
The patterns of the vacuum zone which were wove by millions of connections affecting almost all 
participants in the real economy and on financial markets. The break through mechanisms that result 
the leaving of the vicious cycle of the financial crisis behind can be supported by the functions of the 
independent SAI activating all potential resources and possibilities it could have (see Figure 1). 
Figure 1: The “vicious cycle” of the financial crisis 
 
TP=Taxpayer; I=Investor; CSO=Civil Society Organization, B=Business organization; SI=Special 
institution 
Source: own edited on the basis of the referenced publications 
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When the economy starts to find the path back on the expansion and the tempers calm down, the 
decision makers could take one step forward. 
IV. Exit strategies: It refers to the gradual, phasing abolition of the policy measures where the timely 
exit could save public money. Certain interventions run out automatically (guarantees on new 
liabilities, guarantees on existing assets) and the rest induce further actions (e.g. recapitalization, asset 
purchase). Central Banks have to use the method of the gradual withdrawal as well affecting the 
monetary stimulus paying relevant attention on the international harmonization among National 
Banks.  
The crisis-related auditing functions and features (CRAFF) of an individual SAI related to the exit 
strategies (National Audit Office of Finland, 2011): 
- SAI should assess the risks to citizens about the exit strategies 
- new audit task is the evaluation of the selling of public-owned assets 
- the auditing mechanism on exit strategies requires performance reports and special skills 
- to deliver experiences/lessons to public bodies 
- preparation for the future challenges 
V. New order: According to the Subgroup 2a report the crisis revealed many weak points, failures in 
the regulatory system. After analyzing the experiences a “New order” must be created which would be 
able to minimize the future risks of a possible financial storm. The main problems – which the 
INTOSAI Task Force Subgroup highlighted, emphasized – were the following: 
1. The crisis emerged from the real economy and the anomalies were exponentially escaladed by 
the false, incorrect risk assessment, misinterpretation of the hazard of derivatives 
(Collateralized Debt Obligations, Asset Backed Securities etc.) and the failures of the 
regulatory system. 
2. exclusion of social costs, burdens of the depression by the financial institutions 
3. not enough knowledge and information about the connectedness of different actors and 
organization 
4. imbalance between safety, resilience, stability and efficiency, innovation, self-interest, profit 
hunting (National Audit Office of Finland, 2011) 
The crisis-related auditing functions and features (CRAFF) of an individual SAI connecting to the new 
order is very similar to the preparedness phase (see above). 
3. Cooperation among SAIs 
Although the supreme audit institutions have wide range of relations covering the largest proportion of 
the economy, thereafter I focus merely on the EU-level professional connections, on the European 
Court of Auditors (ECA) and the International Organization of Supreme Audit Institutions (INTOSAI) 
and I shortly summarize only the frameworks of the liaisons. The cooperation (the joint working) is an 
excellent basis for knowledge creation, knowledge sharing and the flow of the best practices, 
trustworthy information in the community of the external auditors. As a result of the cooperation the 
SAIs could use its resources more effectively and finally increase the short-term effects and long-term 
impacts of its auditing functions.  
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The European Court of Auditors (ECA) – the external audit institution of the European Union – 
perceiving the importance and the latent opportunities of the utilization of non-conventional resources 
like knowledge or the social capital constantly strive to enhance to build up closer, more efficient 
connections with similar institutions. Under the notion of social capital I interpret the positive 
externalities, advantageous synergies which arise from the formal and informal structures of 
collaboration, the mutual trust and professional recognition within the SAI commune supplemented 
permanently or occasionally by other organizations. The ECA pays special attention to SAIs from the 
EU Member States, the candidate and the possible candidate countries (official web page of the 
ECA3). I distinguish here two types of collaboration: (1) Regulated audit cooperation: – regarding the 
revenues and expenditures of the Community especially the drawdown of EU funds – where the 
Member State SAI shall to cooperate with the European Court of Auditors in accordance with the 
Article 287 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (European Union, 2008). The flow 
of information and experiences under the aegis of this type of cooperation enable the national external 
auditors to improve the quality of their operation/auditing work, methodologies and to achieve high-
level implementation of the international audit standards (e.g. ISSAI). (2) Voluntary cooperation: 
where the participants recognize the gains of the mutual advantages and try to find different links, 
possibilities to work together and share special learnings with each other on voluntary basis. The 
liaisons between the ECA and other SAIs basically takes place within the frameworks of the “Contact 
Committee of the Supreme Audit Institutions of the European Union4” or parallel with this the ECA 
tries to help facilitating the integration processes of candidate states. The Contact Committee (CC) 
consists of the presidents of the SAIs including the ECA, the Committee of Liaison Officers and 
Working Groups dealing with well-defined audit topics. In fact the Contact Committee is an 
autonomous, independent and non-political framework fostering the exchange of professional 
knowledge and experiences on the audit activities focusing on the EU-budget and other EU-related 
issues. The CC held its first meeting in 1960, so the ECA which was established in 1977 could not be 
among the founders, it joined in 1978. The Committee provides a professional platform to improve the 
frameworks, conditions for cooperation among national SAIs and the ECA as well as to increase the 
impacts of audit reports concerning EU public resources. The CC provides several frameworks to 
reach its strategic goals: meetings5, workshops, task forces, working and expert groups (some 
examples are: Working Group on National SAI Reports on EU Financial Management, Working 
Group on Structural Funds III, Working Group on Activities on Value Added Tax, Expert Group on 
Audit Quality) (Contact Committee, 2007) 
The International Organization of Supreme Audit Institutions (INTOSAI) is a professional 
organization providing an institutionalized forum for the SAIs from around the world to promote 
development and knowledge transfer, to discuss specific issues of mutual interest, to increase the 
added-value of the audits, to disseminate the latest developments in auditing and other applicable 
professional standards and best practices. It was founded in 1953 and it has 189 full members 
(including the ECA) and four associate members6. INTOSAI recognizes that its strength lies in 
cooperation, experiences, special capacities and knowledge deriving from the cultural, social, 
economic and governmental diversity of its global membership. The INTOSAI’s motto reflects this 
creed: “Mutual Experience Benefits All – Experientia Mutua Omnibus Prodest (lat.)”(INTOSAI, 2007; 
                                                     
3
 European Court of Auditors homepage: http://eca.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/eca_main_pages/home 
4
 Contact Committe official homepage: http://circa.europa.eu/irc/eca/sai/info/data/cc_website/cc/index_en.htm 
5
 The members of the Contact Committe meet once a year while the liaison officers of the european SAIs and the 
ECA meet twice 
6
 Associate members of the INTOSAI: Association des Institutions Supérieures de Contrôle Ayant en Commun 
lusage du français (AISCCUF), Organization of SAIs of Portuguese Speaking Countries (CPLP), The Institute of 
Internal Auditors (IIA), World Bank 
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INTOSAI, 2010c). The INTOSAI has formed several frameworks for collaboration: regional working 
groups, working groups, committees, task forces and the INTOSAI Development Initiative (IDI) with 
special missions responding, reacting to global risks, conditions and with the mission to maximize the 
efficiency of individual SAIs. Regional Working Groups7 allow the members to cooperate on regional 
level. Working Groups deal with specific technical issues in order to meet the member SAIs’ 
expectations. The Committees are entitled to deal with issues of relevant, recurring interest to all 
member organizations. Task forces operate only for a defined period of time and they will be dissolved 
when they finish their special tasks. Finally the INTOSAI Development Initiative is responsible for the 
audit capacity building in which the auditors take part in training programmes, seminars, workshops, 
regional satellite and partnership programmes in problematic areas of public auditing (INTOSAI 
homepage: www.intosai.org). To responde the new challenges of the financial crisis the INTOSAI has 
one working group and one task force in house focusing directly on the causes, consequences and the 
solutions of the extreme turmoil: Working Group on Public Debt and Task Force Global Financial 
Crisis. The spatial structure of the cooperative mechanisms is depicted in Figure 2. 
Figure 2: Connections of the national SAI with other external auditors regarding the crisis 
 
Source: own edited on the basis of referenced publications 
It should be noted, that neither the INTOSAI, nor the ECA does not have supremacy over the member 
countries and the national SAIs, only horizontal relations can be observed. In the figure the arrows 
                                                     
7
 INTOSAI has 7 Regional Working Groups: Organization of Latin American and Caribbean Supreme Audit 
Institutions (OLACEFS), African Organization of Supreme Audit Institutions (AFROSAI), Arab Organization of 
Supreme Audit Institutions (ARABOSAI), Asian Organization of Supreme Audit Institutions (ASOSAI), Pacific 
Association of Supreme Audit Institutions (PASAI), Caribbean Organization of Supreme Audit Institutions 
(CAROSAI) and European Organization of Supreme Audit Institutions (EUROSAI) 
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which pointing in only one direction towards the national SAI indicate that the maintenance of 
substantive connections with actors and organizations – with the ability to provoke changes in the 
socio-economic environment – regardless of whether they are in the audit scope, affected by the crisis 
or not. 
4. Concluding remarks 
As it was discussed above both the general auditing functions and features (GAFF) and the crisis-
related auditing functions and features (CRAFF) require flexibility, special capacities and the 
utilization of conventional and non-conventional resources. If the SAIs manage to mobilize all kinds 
of resorts (inputs) and optimize their budget in accordance with the new challenges then they could 
contribute to the successful governmental crisis-management moreover to the prevention of such 
anomalies. The establishment of a free access online platform containing databases, audit reports and 
their follow-up about the GAFF and the CRAFF of a certain SAI could increase the impact of the 
auditing work, the confidence, transparency and the respect of the SAI. In fact there are some existing 
electronic web pages dealing with recovery plans or the performance of external auditing (e.g. about 
the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act – http://www.recovery.gov/Pages/default.aspx or the 
INTOSAI IDI online database with restricted access to the public: SAI Capacity Development 
Database http://www.saidevelopment.org/default.aspx) (National Audit Office of Finland, 2011) but 
they are not concerning about the full complexity of the crisis. The new database should be set up in 
order to: 
- make transparent the everyday operation and resources of a certain SAI 
- facilitate the cooperation and the knowledge between SAIs and other actors of the economy 
- build or increase citizens’ trust and respect towards the auditing community 
- grant easy access and availability of the selected (not confidential) data and information which 
could inveigle academic researchers to analyze the SAIs functions, impacts, relations and 
embeddedness in the processes of the socio-economic background 
- make it possible for SAIs to evaluate the work or reactions of an another SAI on professional 
basis (“online peer-review”) 
- increase publicity and in consequence the value-added of audit reports on specific issues 
- foster information flow between SAI and taxpayers 
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